Patron-client relationships as the factor of the gubernatorial corps formation in Russia

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Ongoing discussion

- Electoral returns and absence of conflicts – key criteria (mid-2000s)
- Centralization via appointing of ‘Varangians’ (Turovskii 2010);
- Elected vs appointed (Buckley, Frye, Garifullina 2011);
- Democratization or consolidation Putin’s power? (Moses 2014);
- Legitimacy vs control (Blakkisrud 2015);
Rules of the game: periods

- 1990-1991 – Governors either elected directly or appointed by regional legislatures;
- 1991-1993 – President appointed heads of regional administrations;
- 1993-1997 – Mixed system (mainly elected);
- 1997-2005 – Elected ubiquitously (except few cases);
- 2005-2012 – Appointed by President with the approval of regional legislatures;
- 2012 – onwards – Elected ubiquitously (except few cases)
Number of replaced governors by year

## Regional clienteles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>Major patrons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political patrons</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Volodin – 7, Sobyanin - 4,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-corporation patrons</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chemezov – 3, Miller - 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private business patrons</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rotenbergs, Timchenko – 4 (each), Kovalchuks - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security officials and bodies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Patrushev - 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional elite</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tatarstan, Krasnoyarsk Krai,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Savchenko (Belgorod), Kozhemyako (Primorsky Krai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nosov (Magadan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

▪ Federal center is not a monolith;

▪ Various federal actors are involved in governors’ appointing process;

▪ Less independent governors and governors backed by regional elites;

▪ More governors backed by state-corporations and big business
Thank you for your attention!