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# Patron-client relationships as the factor of the gubernatorial corps formation in Russia

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
# Ongoing discussion

- Electoral returns and absence of conflicts – key criteria (mid-2000s)
- Centralization via appointing of ‘Varangians’ (Turovskii 2010);
- Elected vs appointed (Buckley, Frye, Garifullina 2011);
- Democratization or consolidation Putin’s power? (Moses 2014);
- Legitimacy vs control (Blakkisrud 2015);

# Rules of the game: periods

- 1990-1991 – Governors either elected directly or appointed by regional legislatures;
- 1991-1993 – President appointed heads of regional administrations;
- 1993-1997 – Mixed system (mainly elected);
- 1997-2005 – Elected ubiquitously (except few cases);
- 2005-2012 – Appointed by President with the approval of regional legislatures;
- 2012 – onwards – Elected ubiquitously (except few cases)

# Number of replaced governors by year



# Regional clientele

	<b>2019</b>	<b>Major patrons</b>
Political patrons	38	Volodin – 7, Sobyanin - 4,
State-corporation patrons	8	Chemezov – 3, Miller - 2
Private business patrons	14	Rotenbergs, Timchenko – 4 (each), Kovalchuks - 2
Security officials and bodies	8	Patrushev - 2
Regional elite	3	Tatarstan, Krasnoyarsk Krai,
Independent	6	Savchenko (Belgorod), Kozhemyako (Primorsky Krai)
Other	8	Nosov (Magadan)

# Conclusions

- Federal center is not a monolith;
- Various federal actors are involved in governors' appointing process;
- Less independent governors and governors backed by regional elites;
- More governors backed by state-corporations and big business

# Thank you for your attention!



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