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# **OCCUPATIONAL INTENTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION UNDERGRADUATES**

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## **OCCUPATIONAL INTENTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION UNDERGRADUATES**

Augmenting behavioral public administration to occupational intention research we investigate the link between three types of motivation, and the intention of students to work in civil service after graduation. We make detailed observations of the self-reported job preferences of 2nd public administration undergraduates in two prestigious universities in Moscow, Russian Federation. We report that federal civil service is the top destination for Russian PA undergraduates. We also report that working in federal civil service by far triumphs over regional public administration in terms of self-reported occupational intention. We also make in-depth observations of the expected utility underlying students' job preferences. We use these observations to propose a general model of civil service job intention. The model posits that the intention to work in civil service after graduation results from two major sources: the perceived expectation from parents with a civil service background, and the expected utility from four benefits of public sector employment. We empirically demonstrate that public service motivation is positively correlated with the intention to work in civil service after graduation<sup>3</sup>.

JEL Classification: D73, H83.

Keywords: Behavioral Public Administration, Occupational preference formation, civil service job intention, public service motivation, Russia.

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## 1. Introduction

Augmenting existing behavioral approaches to occupational intention research we investigate the link between four types of extrinsic and intrinsic personal and work motivation, and the intention of students to work in civil service after graduation. We make detailed observations of the self-reported job preferences of public administration (PA) undergrads in two prestigious universities in Moscow. We also make in-depth observations of the expected utility underlying students' job preferences. We use these observations as a basis for a theory of occupational preference formation among future public servants. By doing so our paper connects to three strands in administrative science research: behavioral public administration (BPA; Simon 1997, Olson 2015), human resource management, and decision making theory. In particular public service motivation (PSM; Perry 1996, Perry and Vandenberg 2015) has been among the core concepts of modern behavioral public administration and facilitates our understanding of both individual and organizational level performance in public agencies. Recent evidence from large scale surveys show that Russian individuals who are actually employees in public sector organizations self-report a higher level of public service motivation compared to their private sector counterparts (Bullock, Stritch and Rainey 2015). Recent theoretical and empirical research also draws a clear link between public service motivation and occupational intention. For instance Bangcheng et al. (2011) find that jobseekers with high levels of public service motivation exhibit preferences for public sector employment.

We start from the assumed causality that the attitudes and motivations of PA undergraduates determine their job choice. In line with existing research we hypothesize that PA students with a high level of self-reported public service motivation (PSM) have a higher intention to work in civil service after graduation. We further hypothesize that parents working in civil service are positively correlated with a student's preference for a job in civil service.

Our findings are based on a survey among nearly 300 Public Administration undergraduates in two prestigious universities in Moscow. From our unique new dataset we find that a job in federal government / civil service is the top destination of PA undergrads in the Russian capital. Open an own business is ranked second at par with getting further higher education. We find that Moscow PA undergraduates self-report high levels of PSM and power motivation, and very high levels of achievement motivation. Furthermore we are able to identify nine motives for PA undergraduates in Russia to work in civil service after

graduation. Based on logistics regression estimation techniques we are able to demonstrate that PSM is positively correlated with the intention to work in civil service after graduation. Estimates provide no empirical support for hypotheses on power and achievement motivation.

## **2. Occupational preference formation: Review of literature**

In order to understand and explain the various motives underlying occupational intention we have to learn about human behavior, motives and its many elements. “A complex mix of motives” drives human behavior (Vandenabeele and Van Loon 2015 p. 369). Motivation itself is multifaceted and has multiple dimensions. Goals, culture, socialization, internationalization and identification (Vandenabeele 2008) antecede the multiple motivational bases of human behavior. People behave in a particular way to obtain rewards, guilt and honor or to avoid punishment. Prior Experiences, socialization and many other events develop various types of motivation. Accordingly a broad range of aspects draws individuals to work for the public sector (Vandenabeele and Van Loon 2015 p. 369). One element is job security; another element is public service motivation. In 1997 James Perry presented results which suggested that “an individual’s public service motivation develops from exposure to a variety of experiences some associated with childhood, some associated with religion, and some associated with professional life” (Perry 1997 p. 190) Public service motivation for instance grounds in rational motives, norm-based motives and affective motives, according to Perry and Wise (Perry and Wise 1990). To very varying degrees people feel attracted to politics and policymaking, value the public interest, and are willing to sacrifice themselves for the well-being of others. Attraction to policymaking, commitment to the public interest, compassion and self-sacrifice are four established dimensions of public service motivation (Perry and Wise 1990, Perry 1996, Perry and Vandenabeele 2015)

Existing behavioral public administration research has focused on the link between public service motivation and civil service job intention. However, the link between prosocial motivation and occupational choice is far from clear-cut. On the one hand a majority of scholars theorizes that prosocial motivation draws people to work in the public sector. The argument why people who feel attracted by helping others should draw to work in civil service is well established (Perry and Wise 1990). And in fact several studies from North America (Perry 1997, Lewis and Frank 2002, Clerkin and Cogburn 2012, Ng and Sears 2015, Boyd et al. 2017, Choi and Chung 2017), Europe (Vandenabeele 2008, Winter and Thaler 2016, Nezhina and Barabashev 2017), and China (Bangcheng et al. 2011) demonstrate

a positive link between prosocial motivation and public sector job intention. Also experimental research (Belle 2015) robustly confirms the statement that public service motivation is a proxy for a calling to public service (Perry and Wise 1990, Ritz et al. 2016). These findings align with more general attraction-selection models of job choice. Theories of person-organization fit (Schneider 1987, Day and Schleicher 2012) posit that „people like to work in an environment which fits with their own preferences” (Vandenabeele 2008 p. 1091). Accordingly individuals who do not mind helping others at the expense of their own time and resources are more likely to be found in public sector jobs.

On the other hand some scholars have questioned this well-established link for theoretical and empirical reasons: prosocial motivation may simply result from on-the-job socialization rather than from an attraction selection mechanism. From this perspective adaption to prosocial norms in public sector organizations determines the level of public service motivation – and not the other way around (Kjeldsen and Jacobson 2013). For an incumbent civil servant it might be ecologically rational to self-report a high level of public service motivation. Kjeldsen and Jacobsen (2013) study prosocial motivation of Danish physiotherapist students before and after their first job entry. Their findings suggest that PSM is not relevant for attraction to public sector employment at all. The level of PSM declines after job entry into both the private and the public sector; this shock effect is smaller among fresh civil servants compared to for-profit sector newbies, however.

Existing evidence suggests that the link between prosocial motivation and occupational preference formation varies by administrative context and culture. In some countries (US, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Russia, China) prosocial motivation reportedly draws young people to work in nonprofit sectors, while in other countries (Denmark) it does not. For the first time in Russia only recently Tamara Nezhina and Alexey (Nezhina and Barabashev 2017) investigated the link between prosocial motivation of MPA students and their intention to work in government upon graduation. Using survey data from 203 MPA students in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Tyumen they find that prosocial motivation positively links to civil service job intention. Existing evidence from administrative sciences further suggests that to answer the question whether prosocial motivation of public servants results from socialization or attraction-selection mechanisms it is reasonable to study individuals that possess little to nothing working experience in the public sector, e.g. public administration undergraduates.


Researchers from other behavioral sciences have proposed more general models of job preference formation. Jae Yup and McCormick (Jae Yup and McCormick 2011) propose a framework in which idiocentrism-future, allocentrism-family and long-term orientation indirectly predict occupational intention. Indirectly because they influence other variables, which later influence occupational intention. Jae Yup and John McCormick report that Australian high school students who were idiocentric towards the future and allocentric towards their family value occupational interest and enjoyment. And positive attitudes towards an occupation result in strong intention to actually pursue a particular occupation.

Fishbein (1967) has proposed a model of behavioral intention and behavior. Applying this model Greenstein et al. (1979) study the antecedents of female occupational choice. They find that “friends, professors/advisors, parents and professionals in the occupation are the major covariates affecting [job] intention [of female US students]. [...] it appears that the subject’s beliefs about the expectations of relevant others are significantly more important than the perceived consequences associated with an occupation” (Greenstein et al. 1979 p. 360).

Hartung et al. (2010) report that US college students with a collectivist mind do not exhibit occupational planning behavior that is different from to their more individualistic peers. “Individualism reflects cultural patterns promoting independence. [...] Autonomy, agency and separation define individualism” (Hartung et al. 2010 p. 35) Collectivists tend to comply with in group-norms from families, communities, or nations, “individualists prefer values such as hedonism and self-direction” (Hartung et al. 2010 p. 35).

### 3. A general model of civil service job intention

**Figure 1: A general model of civil service job intention**



*Notes: Own figure.*

We use our new unique observations as a basis for a theory of occupational preference formation among future public servants. Our model posits that the intention to work in the public sector results from:

1. The perceived expectations from relevant others,
2. The willingness to comply with these expectations,
3. A cost-benefit analysis reflecting expected utility from four benefits from public sector employment.

We state that three types of motivation navigate the cost-benefit calculus: public service motivation, power motivation, and achievement motivation. We further state that an aspiration level mediates the impact the expected utility from public sector employment has in civil service job intention. Below we explain our model in detail, derive a number of detailed hypotheses and give a review of literature for each underlying assumption.

#### **Perceived expectations from relevant others**

Our model predicts that both parents and relatives working in civil service are positively correlated with a student's preference for a job in civil service. We argue that students perceive an implicit or explicit expectation to follow a 'given' occupational path. Parents socialize their kids in many different ways. They do it directly when they recommend them to

enroll at a School of Public Administration, and to work in civil service after graduation. They do it indirectly when children observe and potentially mimic the behavior of their parents. From their very early years children and teenagers experience when and what mommy and daddy tell about their jobs.

*Hypothesis 1* (perceived expectation for public sector employment from parents): Parents working in civil service are positively correlated with a student's preference for a job in civil service.

We expect a much smaller impact from prior job choice of relatives in job preference formation of students compared to prior parental choices. Relatives are just not that influential as parents are. Relatives working in public sector are expected to create a much smaller perceived expectation.

*Hypothesis 2* (prior occupational choice of relatives): Relatives working in civil service are positively correlated with a student's preference for a job in civil service. We expect a smaller relationship compared to parental job choice.

### **Willingness to comply with expectations from relevant others**

The impact of prior parental (and from relatives) occupation choice on the intention to work in public sector is mediated by an individualism-collectivism types of personality. For students exhibiting a collectivistic mindset parental job choice will have a greater impact compared to students with a more individualistic mindset.

*Hypothesis 3* (collectivistic mindset mediates impact of relevant others): For students exhibiting a collectivistic mindset parental job choice will have a greater impact compared to students with a more individualistic mindset.

### **Expected utility from public sector employment: Three types of motivation**

Our model posits that people feel attracted by a civil service job if they may expect high utility from it. The combined expected utility derives from individual valuation of four potential benefits: job security, stable income, and the opportunity to serve the public interest and to affect and implement public policies. Valuation for each potential benefit positively links to expected utility and thus behavioral intention. We thus hypothesize that people who value job security are likely to exhibit a high intention to work in public service, and so do people who value a stable income and the opportunity to serve the public interest and/or affect



public policies. We implicitly assume that all four factors equally contribute to combined expected utility function, since we lack theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to do differently. We also assume a simple linear utility function.

*Hypothesis 4* (valuation of job security): A student's valuation of job security is positively associated with her intention to work in civil service.

*Hypothesis 5* (valuation of stable income): Individuals, who value stable and secure income, including guarantees for post-employment pension entitlements, exhibit a high post-graduate intention for civil service employment.

*Hypothesis 6* (valuation of opportunity to serve the public interest and community members): Individuals who value the opportunity to service community members and / or the public interest are likely to exhibit a high level of behavioral intention for civil service employment.

*Hypothesis 7* (attraction to public policy making and implementation): A student who feels attracted by the opportunity to influence the making and implementation of public policies is likely to exhibit a high degree of post-graduation civil service job intention.

We posit that three types of motivation navigate the cost-benefit calculation: public service motivation, achievement motivation and power motivation.

### **Three types of motivation**

We further assume that high PSM leads to high intention to work in civil service. We think that underlying causality is that the attitudes and motivations of PA undergraduates determine their job choices (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959). Public Service Motivation indicates to what extent an individual feels motivated to maximize the general public interest and to serve the well-being of other people even at their own expense (Perry 1996). We hypothesize that those students who self-report a high level PSM plan to work in civil service after graduation. We also hypothesize that they find civil service employment attractive (even if they do not plan to work their immediately, e.g., because they intend to improve their job market position by earning a masters' degree).

*Hypothesis 8a* (public service motivation): PSM is positively correlated with intention to work in civil service after graduation.

*Hypothesis 8b* (public service motivation): PSM is positively correlated with perceived attractiveness of civil service employment.

Power motivation means that people want to exercise authority over others. Government agencies are hierarchic organizations; they offer plenty of opportunities to exercise power over subordinates (just by following the rules). Power motivation and achievement motivation drive attraction to policy making. Our model posits to what extent an individual values the opportunity to affect public policy making depends on her level of power motivation and her level of achievement motivation. In bureaucratic psychology “[i]ndividuals with a strong power motivation seek career advancement as a means of gaining fame and/or authority over others.” (Teodoro 2011 p. 71). Achievement motivation also fuels bureaucratic ambitions, but underlying psychological motives are quite different. “In public administration, individuals with strong achievement motivation may seek career advancement as a means to or consequence of accomplishing excellent performance.” (Teodoro 2011 p. 21). We hypothesize that students with a high level of power motivation are attracted by hierarchies in government agencies.

*Hypothesis 9a* (power motivation – after graduation): PM is positively correlated with intention to work in civil service after graduation.

*Hypothesis 9b* (power motivation – attractiveness): PM is positively correlated with perceived attractiveness of civil service employment.

The level of achievement motivation indicates to what extent the behavior of an individual is driven by a desire to achieve particular goals. Goal-oriented management or performance related public management has been promoted since the mid-1980ies. But apart from professionals with weakly defined roles public administration is similar to constraint-driven management (Wilson 1989); standard-operating procedures (SOP) regulate and standardize the behavior of civil servants leaving little discretion to civil servants with clearly defined roles performing observable activities. We expect that such an environment in civil service employment will not attract people with achievement motivation. It does not fit their personality type.

*Hypothesis 10a*: (achievement motivation – after graduation): AM is negatively correlated with intention to work in civil service after graduation.

Hypothesis 10b: (achievement motivation – attractiveness): AM is negatively correlated with perceived attractiveness of civil service employment.

### **Aspiration level**

Our model further assumes that each individual has an aspiration level; that is, an expected pay-off from a potential action. The level of aspiration may range from zero (no expectations) to infinity, i.e. unrealistic expectations that will never be satisfied. Our model posits that the aspiration level of an individual mediates the relationship between her perceived utility from public sector employment and her behavioral intention.

## **4. Where do you want to work tomorrow? Job intentions of PA undergraduates in Russia**

### **The Russian administrative context**

The Russian administrative context has been influenced both by Soviet bureaucratic legacy and the supersonic transformation from central planning to a market economy in the early 1990ies. The accompanying ideological turn has nullified old ethical norms but failed to establish new moral standards. Facing this “absence of clear societal norms” and based on results from a pilot study Nezhina and Barabashev (2017, p. 7) argue that James Perry’s “normative ‘motivation’ is irrelevant in the Russian transitional context”.

Some scholars consider Russian bureaucracy best described by features like extreme hierarchies, prone to corruption, inefficiencies and mismanagement, or in the dramatic words of A. V. Obolonsky, Russian bureaucracy is “extremely archaic and ineffective and morally corrupts even initially honest people, both inside and outside state structures.” (Obolonskii and Barabashev, 2014, p. 78). Accordingly there is a widespread perception of corruption (Rimskii 2014, Public Opinion Foundation. 2014), and a low level of trust in government and civil service. These judgements contrast with continuous civil service reform both at federal and regional level since the 2000ies. The reforms were largely driven by the central government and intended to “make public servants independent from political influence, to reduce the number of government functions and the size of the workforce in public offices, and to establish a competitive recruitment and pay-for-performance system” (Nezhina and Barabashev 2017, p. 5).

## **New survey evidence**

We surveyed a non-representative sample of 295 undergraduate students at two higher education institutions in Moscow, Russian Federation. There are two big types of surveys, statistical surveys (Groves et al. 2004) and qualitative surveys (Jansen 2010). Statistical “surveys use a sample of members to measure population characteristics” (Jansen 2010, [2]) Statistical representativeness of the sample is a main issue in the case of quantitative sample surveys. (Jansen 2010, [5]) In contrast qualitative surveys intend to investigate the diversity of behavior within a given population. “[A] survey is a qualitative survey if it does not count the frequencies of categories (/values), but searches for the empirical diversity in the properties of members, even if these properties are expressed in numbers.” (Jansen 2010, [11]) Our data does not match this definition of qualitative survey data. We therefore assume to use statistical survey data. The population of our study constitutes all public administration undergraduates in Moscow; five major universities and higher education institutions offer public administration bachelor degree programs. The sampling frame consists of some 1,000 students enrolled in one of these programs. To obtain data we directly approached students asking them to participate in a scientific survey. Students were briefly informed about the very general purpose of the research, namely to learn about job preferences upon graduation. Details on underlying assumptions and hypotheses were not provided. Voluntary participation and anonymity of responses was assured at any stage of the data gathering processes. We gathered the data on all variables of interest in a paper-based questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered to participants after about a dozen of different educational courses over a two-week period in spring 2016. We received 295 completed questionnaires from second year students of Bachelor degree public administration programs at two higher education institutions in Moscow, Russian Federation. Bachelor degree public administration programs are also offered in numerous universities outside the capital. We restrict to students Moscow to investigate job preference formation in the context of unrestricted educational and employment opportunities (Nezhina and Barabashev 2017, p. 13). Moscow is the administrative, political and financial center of Russia offering a wide range of choice regarding education programs and job opportunities upon graduation. In other parts of Russia government is often a primary employer resulting in potential bias of civil service job intention among students (Nezhina and Barabashev 2017).

We surveyed students from two different institutions because we may expect diversity in personal values and beliefs between the two groups of students. We selected the two higher

education institutions because both have well established and recognized public administration programs. At the same time the mission statement of both institutions significantly varies: the first institution has been following a liberal western-oriented approach, while the second institution adopted educational reforms framed by a more domestic orientation.

**Figure 2: What Russian PA undergraduates intend to do upon graduation**

| <b>After graduation I plan to</b>              | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>%</b>   |
|--|------------------|------------|
| Work in the federal government / civil service | 76               | 25.8       |
| Open my own business                           | 54               | 18.3       |
| Get further higher education                   | 54               | 18.3       |
| Do not know yet                                | 49               | 16.6       |
| Work in private sector firm                    | 24               | 8.1        |
| Work for Regional Government                   | 20               | 6.8        |
| Work in science/education sector               | 5                | 1.7        |
| Change profession                              | 5                | 1.7        |
| Other (unspecified)                            | 2                | 0.7        |
| Army   | 2                | 0.7        |
| marriage                                       | 2                | 0.7        |
| Aeroflot                                       | 1                | 0.3        |
| Family business                                | 1                | 0.3        |
| <b>Total</b>                                   | <b>295</b>       | <b>100</b> |

*Notes: Own data. Responses from a 2016 survey questionnaire among 295 2nd year PA undergrad students in two prestigious universities in Moscow). Nine+ choice outcome. Nine+ means that respondents had the opportunity to specify “others” in their own words; and five of them actually did.*

A job in federal government / civil service is the top destination of PA undergrads in the Russian capital – that is our first main observation. One in four (25.8%) PA students intend to work in a federal government agency after graduation. The next – and somewhat surprising – observation is that 18.3 per cent of respondents plan to open an own business after graduation. The same share of students (54 individuals, or 18.3 per cent) intend to earn a Master’s degree, or other forms of higher education. Open an own business is ranked second (18.3%) at par with getting further higher education (18.3%), that is, earning a master’s degree or beyond (not necessarily in PA, since the survey items did not ask a particular subject of future studies and/or a desired academic degree). 49 students, that are 16.6 per cent of total respondents, yet do not have a clear plan what and where to work after graduation. A significant share of 2<sup>nd</sup>

year undergrads yet has no clear ideas about life after university; 16.6% self-report that they “do not know yet”, what to do after earning their bachelor’s degree. And 8.1% (24 individuals) intend to work in a private sector business firm.

Two gaps called our attention in this new unique dataset of self-reported first choice job preferences: **The federal-regional attractiveness gap:** Seemingly a job in federal civil service is about four times more attractive than a job in regional government. Only 20 students (6.8 per cent) said that working in regional government is their first job choice, compared to 76 individuals (26 per cent) for federal government. This finding is in line with previous surveys among civil servants employees from one of the co-authors that also showed that federal employment is preferred over regional employment. **The entrepreneur – bureaucracy gap:** The idea of getting started with an own business is more popular among PA undergrads than everything else apart from a federal government top job.

### **Additional qualitative evidence**

We did additional field research to learn about the qualitative motives underlying job preferences. Three weeks after we administered the survey, we presented Figure 2 to three different groups of students that did participate in the survey. The survey was carried out ensuring strict anonymity, so we did not know distributions or job preferences for any of the subsamples. We told them that we asked not only them but similar students, also 2<sup>nd</sup> years PA undergrads, from another prestigious university in Moscow. We did not mention the name of the other university. Then we initiated started open classroom discussion. The three groups consisted of 20-30 students each; small enough to have meaningful discussion; but big enough to ensure voluntary engagement in discussion. We asked:

*Why is federal government job more attractive to you than regional government?*

*What good things or benefits do you expect from federal civil service?*

*What makes opening an own business so attractive?*

*And why not take a job in an international business firm?*

We have two pseudo-independent data sources: The classroom discussion provided qualitative supplementary evidence to the data from survey questionnaire. To disentangle surveys responses from verbal discussion there was a time lag of three weeks between survey response and classroom discussion. Three different subsamples of students took part in

classroom discussion, but they were presented overall results. Questionnaire was administered in Russian, but Figure 1 was presented in English. Each time for the classroom discussion a similar dashboard header was prepared. Figure 3 summarizes students' original statements and dashboard notes from all three classroom discussions.

**Figure 3: Motives underlying job preference formation**

Expected benefits / utility (+); risks and costs (-) from different job opportunities

| Job in federal civil service   | Job in regional civil service                                    | Job in intl. Company (e.g., Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Nestle, KPMG) | Open an own business   |
|--|--|--|--|
| (+) Prestigious  | (-) Less salary  | (+) More independence  | (+) [For many it is like a] dream* [like the story of] Mark Zuckerberg |
| Macro-level  | (-) Less prestigious   | (+) International experience   | (+) More independence  |
| (+) More interesting   | (-) Less power → centralization                                  | (+) Development of a career  | (+) More creative  |
| (+) Higher salary  | (-) Out of big cities  | (+) \$-salaries  | <i>Course instructor asked: Where do you get the money from?</i>       |
|  | (-) No change, same low position for years                       | (+) [Opportunities for] Internship                                     | [From family and] friends  |
| (+) Social recognition   | (-) [smaller] social recognition [than in federal civil service] | (+) Maybe higher salary  | [from] Crowdfunding  |
| (+) Power and glory  |  | (+) social package   | (-) Risks: decision making problems                                    |
| (+) Stability  |  |  | (-) high interest rates**  |
| (+) Job (8 [hours]/6 [days a week])  |  |  | (-) Full time job (24/7)   |
| (+) Social entitlement [=entitlement to social benefits, both in regional and federal service] |  |  | (-) no social benefits   |
| (+) [federal government is] Making law   | (-) [regional government is] Implementing [federal] law (-)      |  | (-) risky  |
| (-) supervision and control  | (-) Less initiative  |  | (+) More freedom   |
| (-) regulated salaries   |  |  | (+) More money   |
| (-) Higher expectations  |  |  | (+) Independence   |
| (+) Living in Moscow   |  |  | (-) full control (targets)   |
| (+) More impact  |  |  |  |
| (+) More administrative resources  |  |  |  |



*Notes: Own data, own compilation. \*One student during classroom discussion, \*\* interest rates for private customer bank loans have been ranging between 15 and 20 per cent p.a. in 2016, when the classroom discussion took place. High interest rates have further soared since sanctions imposed in 2014 and 2015 (Crimea crisis) have cut away Russian banks from international financial markets.*

We identified nine motives underlying job preference formation:

1. *Prestige, recognition, power*: Students think a job in federal civil service gives you more prestige, more power, more social recognition, more impact on policy making and a higher salary than a job in regional government (contributes to our understanding of gap 1 Federal – regional). Power, social recognition and prestige are different things; the main motive here is that they expect *more of everything* in federal compared to regional civil service.
2. *Centralization*: Students are clearly aware of the strongly centralized political and administrative system in Russia. Students expressed their perception that in federal government you are making laws, but regional government is only implementing laws. When you only carry out, decision taken elsewhere, you will witness less impact, receive less recognition, and get less salary than in Moscow.
3. *Impact on policy making*: Undergrads prefer to work in federal government / civil service because they expect to have more impact on making laws and affecting public policy.
4. *Leeway for initiative*: Because regional government only implements federal laws you have less leeway for initiative, students mentioned.
5. *Salary*: Students expect higher salaries in federal than in regional government, because in federal government you have more power and impact. At the same time they mention that in private sector is that you can earn more money, while in civil service pay scales are strictly regulated.
6. *Regulation of behavior*: Some respondents express a negative perception of strict performance measurement schemes, control and supervision by superiors.
7. *Independence*: Students expressed the perception that an own business give you more independence in making decisions.
8. *Living in Moscow*: Students are attracted by the prospect of living and working in Moscow. Federal government is in Moscow, while regional government means living “outside big cities”.
9. *Social benefits*: Students mentioned that in civil service, and in international companies you are entitled to social benefits or social packages compared to a much lower level of social security in your own business.

## 5. Data and methods

We fit a model in which the intention to work in federal or regional civil service (fedregdv) is a function of sex, parents working in civil service (parents), an interaction between two types of collectivistic mindset and parents working in civil service ( $VHC_{par} = [HC+VC] \times parents$ ), vertical and horizontal collectivisms (VHC), relatives working in civil service (relatives), aspiration level (nihil), university (university), achievement motivation (AM), public service motivation (psm), power motivation (power), attitude towards stable income (income: N), and valuation of job security (job: BA).

### Dependent variables

We intend to explain what drives students to strive for civil service employment after graduation. We use two response variables:

- First order job preference for civil service, and
- Perceived attractiveness of civil service employment

The intention to work in civil service after graduation is our first binary response variable. This study measures first order (single choice) preference for civil service with a single item:

After graduation I plan to ... (nine choice outcome, including “working in federal government / civil service”)

25.8 percent of respondents intend to work in federal civil service / government after graduation (=1, 0 otherwise).

Our second response variable is the perceived attractiveness of civil service employment. Respondents were further asked to rank the attractiveness of different career opportunities. Attractiveness of a civil service job is much higher compared to its first order preference. Working in federal government is the first-best job preference for one in four respondents. But almost three in four (74.6%) PA undergrads report that a federal government job is attractive or even highly attractive to them.

A job in federal government / civil service - how attractive is this career opportunity to you? (From 1=very unattractive to 5=very attractive).

**Figure 4: Attractiveness of a job in federal government**

| <b>Job in federal civil service</b> | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>%</b> |
|-------------------------------------|------------------|----------|
| very attractive                     | 144              | 48.8     |
| attractive                          | 76               | 25.8     |
| neither attractive nor unattractive | 47               | 15.9     |
| unattractive                        | 15               | 5.1      |
| very unattractive                   | 13               | 4.4      |
| Total                               | 295              | 100.0    |

*Notes: Own data and figure. Survey question: A job in federal government- how attractive is this to you?*

The distribution is biased towards attractive. Not surprisingly a civil service job in the city of Moscow is attractive or even highly attractive to an overwhelming majority of PA undergraduates (Three in four, 74.6 per cent). For 48.8 per cent of total respondents a job in federal civil service is “highly attractive”. For additional 25.8 per cent working in a federal government agency is “attractive”. 15.9 per cent are neutral. 5.1 per cent consider a federal service job as unattractive, and to 4.4 per cents say it is very unattractive to them.

### **Covariates**

#### *Parents’ occupational aspiration*

The perceived expectation from relevant others (parents’ occupational aspiration) is an unobserved, latent exogenous variable. We do observe whether parents work in civil service (yes=1, and 0 if otherwise).

#### *Individualism*

The motivation to comply with the perceived expectation from relevant others is an unobserved, latent endogenous variable. We use the constructs of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, respectively (Triandis and Gelfand 1998). Individualism and collectivisms are independent dimensions of a person’s personality (Triandis 1995). In horizontal individualism, “people are likely to say ‘I want to do my own thing’”, but do not emphasize a high social status (Triandis and Gelfand 1998 p. 119). In vertical individualism people value social competition to acquire social status. In horizontal collectivism people “emphasize common goals with others, but they do not easily submit to authority” (Triandis and Gelfand 1998 p. 119). In vertical collectivisms people “are willing to sacrifice their

personal goals for the sake of in-group goals” (Triandis and Gelfand 1998 p. 119). In VC, and to a lesser extent in HC, individuals are thus likely to follow occupational paths of their parents; in HI and especially in VI such an effect is rather unlikely.

For this study VC was based on two items and HC on three items. VI was based on two items and HI was based on a single item.

#### *Vertical collectivism*

When I see that the other cannot follow my speed I slow down because I do not want that the others think bad about me (five choice outcome, from 1=not important at all to 5=very important)

It is important to me that my student fellows think good about me (five choice outcome, from 1=not important at all to 5=very important)

#### *Horizontal collectivism*

I help out friends even if this means I have less time to do my own work. (five choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

If you can easily help a friend it is alright to deviate from the regular procedure. (five choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

For group-work I like to be in a team with someone I know very well personally, even if s/he is not very productive (five choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

#### *Vertical individualism (VI)*

Having a clear goal in live is important to me (five choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

Being successful in whatever I do is important to me (five choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

#### *Horizontal individualism (HI)*

Being independent in making my decisions is important to me (five choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

To receive meaningful answers and to reflect the Russian cultural context all items were developed in Russian. “We computed each individual’s” HC, VC, HI and VI “scores as the sum of the items” described above. (Triandis and Gelfand 1998 p. 121). High VC and HC scores are expected to increase the slope of parents working in public sector on behavioral intention. Attitude HC, attitude VC, attitude HI and attitude VI are measurements of M.

The expected utility from the potential benefits of public sector employment is an unobserved, latent endogenous variable. In our model EU has four dimensions, one for each potential benefit. We state that dimension ‘job security’ and ‘stable income’ are driven by rational motives, while dimension ‘serving the public interest’ and ‘affecting public policy’ are based on affective motives.

#### *Power motivation*

This study measures power motivation with two items. Rob Eisinga, Manfred te Grotenhuis and Ben Pelzer (2013, p. 641) conclude that the “most appropriate reliability statistic for a two-item scale is the Spearman-Brown coefficient that together with standardized coefficient alpha”. Therefore we report both scale reliability measures. Both Cronbach’s alpha and Spearman-Brown coefficient for the two-item scale equal 0.67.

PA to me means an opportunity to make a career, become boss (3.4)

PA to me means the ability to take a position in the national elite, have a prestigious job (3.5)

Respondents self-report a high level of power motivation. The mean value is 3.8 on a 1-5 scale, which is above the mid-point of the scale and bit higher than the average psm-score (3.71). The level of power motivation significantly differs between the two universities: Students from the university One self-report a higher level of power motivation (group mean=4.0) than their peers in university Two (group mean=3.75).<sup>4</sup>

#### *Achievement motivation*

This study measures achievement motivation with six items (Cronbach’s alpha=0.65).

PA to me is a Means to become a high end professional (3.8)

PA to me is a mean to do my work better than others (3.9)

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<sup>4</sup> We compute a t-statistic to test the null hypothesis that the average power motivation scores are the same in the both groups. The t-statistic is -1.76 and its two-side p-value is 0.08.

PA to me is an opportunity to prove myself (3.10)

Having a clear goal in life is important to me to (7.1)

Achieving a goal is important to me to (7.2)

Being successful in whatever I do is important to me (7.5)

Students from both universities univocally self-report a very high level of achievement motivation, the mean value is 4.2, and the minimum observed value is 2.5, i.e. the smallest observed response equals the midpoint of the scale.

Power motivation, achievement motivation and public service motivation are observed exogenous variables.

#### *Public service motivation*

This study measures public service motivation with four items (Cronbach's  $\alpha=0.62$ ): *To me public administration is ...*

*To me public administration is a means to help other people* (3.2) (five choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

*To me public administration is patriotic service to Motherland* (3.3)

*To me public administration is an opportunity to change something in society and world* (3.11)

The students from university One report higher PSM scores (group mean 3.76) compared to students from university Two (group mean 3.58).<sup>5</sup>

Measurement of an individual's attitude towards stable income was based on two items (Spearman-Brown coefficient = 0.4, Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.4$ ):

Public administration to me means stable increasing income (five-choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

Public administration to me means an opportunity to receive social benefits (five-choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

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<sup>5</sup> The difference between the psm-scores is statistically significant. We compute a t-statistic to test the null hypothesis that the average psm-scores are the same in the both groups. The t-statistic is 1.66 and its two-side p-value is 0.097.

Valuation of job security was measured by a single item:

Trying to avoid mistakes is important to me (five-choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree)

*Aspiration level*

Our model states that each individual has an aspiration level; AL affects the slope of M on behavioral intention, y. Aspiration level is measured by a single item:

(*Reverse*) Public administration is just yet another profession (five-choice outcome, from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree).

Summary statistics are reported in Figure 5.



**Figure 5: Summary statistics**

| id                | Dependent variables  | N            | M    | SD   | Minimum | Maximum |
|-------------------|--|--------------|------|------|---------|---------|
| 1 feddv           | After graduation I plan to work in FEDERAL civil service             | 295          | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0       | 1       |
|                   | Yes  | 76 (25.8 %)  |      |      |         |         |
|                   | No   | 219 (74.2 %) |      |      |         |         |
| 2 regdv           | After graduation I plan to work in REGIONAL civil service            | 295          | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0       | 1       |
|                   | Yes  | 20 (6.8 %)   |      |      |         |         |
|                   | No   | 275 (93.2 %) |      |      |         |         |
| 3 fedregdv        | After graduation I plan to work in federal OR regional civil service | 295          | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0       | 1       |
|                   | Yes  | 96 (32.6 %)  |      |      |         |         |
|                   | No   | 199 (67.5 %) |      |      |         |         |
| <b>Covariates</b> |  |              |      |      |         |         |
| 4 gender          | Sex (1=female, 0=male)   | 293          | 0.60 | 0.49 | 0       | 1       |
|                   | female   | 175 (59.8 %) |      |      |         |         |
|                   | male   | 118 (40.3 %) |      |      |         |         |
| 5 parents         | Parents working in civil service (1=yes)                             | 294          | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0       | 1       |
|                   | Yes  | 66 (22.5 %)  |      |      |         |         |
|                   | No   | 228 (77.6 %) |      |      |         |         |
| 6 VHC             | Collectivism: allocentric towards relevant others (1 low - 5 high)   | 294          | 3.01 | 0.63 | 1       | 5       |
| 7 VHCpar          | Interaction term: collectivism × parents in civil service            | 293          | 0.68 | 1.30 | 0       | 4.75    |
| 8 relatives       | Relatives working in civil service                                   | 294          | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0       | 1       |
|                   | Yes  | 159 (54.1 %) |      |      |         |         |
|                   | No   | 135 (45.9 %) |      |      |         |         |
| 9 aspiration      | Aspiration level, <i>reverse</i> (1 high - 5 low)                    | 292          | 2.63 | 1.22 | 1       | 5       |
| 10 university     | Higher education institution (1/2)                                   | 295          | 1.26 | 0.44 | 1       | 2       |
|                   | University Two   | 218 (73.9 %) |      |      |         |         |
|                   | University One   | 77 (26.1 %)  |      |      |         |         |
| 11 AM             | Achievement motivation (6 items, alpha=.65)                          | 292          | 4.09 | 0.57 | 2.5     | 5       |
| 12 power          | Power motivation (2 items, SBC=0.67 alpha=.67)                       | 292          | 3.80 | 0.95 | 1       | 5       |
| 13 psm            | Public service motivation (3 items, alpha=.64)                       | 294          | 3.89 | 0.86 | 1       | 5       |
| 14 income         | valuation of stable income   | 295          | 3.49 | 1.13 | 1       | 5       |
| 15 job            | valuation of job security: I try to avoid mistakes                   | 295          | 3.76 | 1.10 | 1       | 5       |

*SBC is for Spearman-Brown coefficient, a reliability statistic*

*Notes: Own data and figure.*

## **Zero-order correlations**

We conducted chi-squared and t-tests and also computed and report point-biserial correlation coefficient as a measure of effect size, and association respectively (Figure 6). The point-biserial correlation coefficient indicates that there is a small positive correlation between level of collectivism and gender; women tend to be more allocentric towards relevant others. The point-biserial correlation coefficient indicates virtually no association between level of PSM and parents working in civil service. This suggests that parents in civil service do not increase the level of PSM. The point-biserial correlation coefficient indicates a strong negative association between relatives in public service and the interaction term VHCpar. The two variables should not be included into an equation simultaneously. Gender and university are not independent of each other (there are more women and fewer men in university One then we would expect if both variables were independent of each other). There is a highly significant positive association between parents and relatives working in the public sector. There is a small negative association between university and aspiration level. Degree of collectivism is correlated with several other motivational constructs, Pearson correlation coefficients are still tolerable and below 0.23. Public service motivation is correlated with achievement motivation ( $r=0.45$ ), power motivation is correlated with valuation of stable income ( $r=0.48$ ).

**Figure 6: Measures of association**

| Dependent variables |  | id | 4  | 5  | 6             | 7             | 8  | 9             | 10           | 11           | 12            | 13           | 14             | 15 |
|---------------------|--|----|--|--|---------------|---------------|--|---------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|----|
| feddv               | After graduation I plan to work in FEDERAL civil service           | 1  |  |  |               |               |  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| regdv               | After graduation I plan to work in REGIONAL civil service          | 2  |  |  |               |               |  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| fedregdv            | After graduation I plan to work in federal OR regional civil servi | 3  |  |  |               |               |  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| Covariates          |  |    |  |  |               |               |  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| gender              | Sex (1=female, 0=male)   | 4  | 1  |  |               |               |  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| parents             | Parents working in civil service (1=yes)                           | 5  | Chi2 = 0.49<br>Pr = 0.485<br>V = 0.0409  | -  |               |               |  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| VHC                 | Collectivism: allocentric towards relevant others (1 low - 5 high) | 6  | 0.21<br>PBS                              | -0.02<br>PBS                               | 1             |               |  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| VHCpar              | Interaction term: collectivism × parents in civil service          | 7  | -0.03<br>PBS                             | not useful                                 | 0.12<br>0.04  | 1             |  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| relatives           | Relatives working in civil service                                 | 8  | Chi2 = 2.57<br>Pr = 0.109<br>V = -0.0938 | Chi2 = 54.9<br>Pr = 0.000<br>V = 0.4329    | -0.01<br>PBS  | -0.41<br>PBS  | 1  |               |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| aspiration          | Aspiration level, reverse (1 high - 5 low)                         | 9  | -0.03<br>PBS                             | 0.03<br>PBS                                | -0.10<br>0.10 | -0.04<br>0.54 | 0.03<br>PBS                                | 1             |              |              |               |              |                |    |
| university          | Higher education instution   | 10 | Chi2 = 5.95<br>Pr = 0.015<br>V = 0.1425  | Chi2 = 0.1671<br>Pr = 0.683<br>V = -0.0238 | 0.06<br>PBS   | 0.02<br>PBS   | Chi2 = 0.9403<br>Pr = 0.332<br>V = -0.0566 | -0.25<br>PBS  | 1            |              |               |              |                |    |
| AM                  | Achievment motivation (6 items, alpha=.65)                         | 11 | 0.16<br>PBS                              | 0.02<br>PBS                                | 0.23<br>0.00  | 0.01<br>0.89  | 0.04<br>PBS                                | -0.18<br>0.00 | 0.07<br>PBS  | 1            |               |              |                |    |
| power               | Power motivation (2 items, SBC=.67, alpha=.67)                     | 12 | 0.08<br>PBS                              | 0.04<br>PBS                                | 0.15<br>0.01  | -0.02<br>0.72 | 0.03<br>PBS                                | 0.09<br>0.13  | -0.10<br>PBS | 0.19<br>0.00 | 1             |              |                |    |
| psm                 | Public service motivation (3 items, alpha=.64)                     | 13 | 0.11<br>PBS                              | -0.05<br>PBS                               | 0.14<br>0.02  | 0.07<br>0.26  | 0.00<br>PBS                                | -0.29<br>0.00 | 0.07<br>PBS  | 0.46<br>0.00 | 0.03<br>0.67  | 1            |                |    |
| income              | valuation of stable income   | 14 | 0.03<br>PBS                              | 0.08<br>PBS                                | 0.20<br>0.00  | -0.04<br>0.45 | 0.06<br>PBS                                | -0.03<br>0.56 | 0.09<br>PBS  | 0.32<br>0.00 | 0.48<br>0.00  | 0.07<br>0.24 | 1              |    |
| job                 | valuation of job security: I try to avoid mistakes                 | 15 | 0.04<br>PBS                              | 0.02<br>PBS                                | 0.16<br>0.01  | -0.02<br>0.79 | 0.03<br>PBS                                | -0.08<br>0.17 | 0.12<br>PBS  | 0.16<br>0.01 | -0.05<br>0.35 | 0.08<br>0.17 | 0.1096<br>0.06 | 1  |

**bold numbers indicate a significance level <0.1**

PBS is for Pearson point serial correlation coefficient, a measure of association between a binary and a continuous variable

Chi2 is for Pearson Chi2, Pr is a significance level

V is for Cramér's V, a measure of association for two binary variables

Notes: Own data and figure

**Figure 7: Estimation results first order job preference**

|  | ( 1 )   | ( 2 )               | ( 3 )               | ( 4 )   | ( 5 )               | ( 6 )               | ( 7 )  | ( 8 )               | ( 9 )               |
|--|---|---------------------|---------------------|---|---------------------|---------------------|--|---------------------|---------------------|
|  | After graduation I plan to work in federal OR regional civil service (Yes=1 / No=0) |                     |                     | After graduation I plan to work in FEDERAL civil service (Yes=1 / No=0) |                     |                     | After graduation I plan to work in REGIONAL civil service (Yes=1 / No=0) |                     |                     |
|  | <i>b</i> , a coefficient ( $\tau$ , a z-statistic)                                  | <i>b</i> ( $\tau$ ) | <i>b</i> ( $\tau$ ) | <i>b</i> ( $\tau$ )   | <i>b</i> ( $\tau$ ) | <i>b</i> ( $\tau$ ) | <i>b</i> ( $\tau$ )  | <i>b</i> ( $\tau$ ) | <i>b</i> ( $\tau$ ) |
| Sex (1=female, 0=male)   | 0.030 (0.11)  | 0.027 (0.10)        | 0.036 (0.13)        | -0.104 (-0.35)  | -0.155 (-0.54)      | -0.125 (-0.43)      | 0.415 (0.77)   | 0.547 (1.05)        | 0.517 (0.99)        |
| Parents working in civil service (1=yes)                           | -0.480 (-0.32)  |                     |                     | -2.140 (-1.30)  |                     |                     | 3.264 (1.38)   |                     |                     |
| Collectivism: allocentric towards relevant others (1 low - 5 high) | -0.462* (-1.77)   | -0.321 (-1.49)      | -0.273 (-1.30)      | -0.606** (-2.16)  | -0.334 (-1.45)      | -0.280 (-1.25)      | 0.280 (0.54)   | -0.088 (-0.22)      | -0.085 (-0.22)      |
| Interaction term: collectivism $\times$ parents in civil service   | 0.460 (0.95)  |                     |                     | 0.908* (1.71)   |                     |                     | -0.755 (-0.96)   |                     |                     |
| Aspiration level, <i>reverse</i> (1 high - 5 low)                  | -0.020 (-0.17)  | -0.097 (-0.88)      |                     | -0.049 (-0.39)  | -0.117 (-0.99)      |                     | 0.074 (0.35)   | 0.009 (0.05)        |                     |
| Higher education instution   | -0.503 (-1.54)  | -0.306 (-0.97)      | -0.438 (-1.43)      | -0.480 (-1.37)  | -0.234 (-0.69)      | -0.353 (-1.07)      | -0.269 (-0.44)   | -0.348 (-0.57)      | -0.456 (-0.78)      |
| Power motivation (2 items, SBC=.67, alpha=.67)                     | 0.114 (0.77)  |                     |                     | 0.288* (1.76)   |                     |                     | -0.344 (-1.46)   |                     |                     |
| Public service motivation (3 items, alpha=.64)                     | 0.631*** (3.33)   |                     | 0.596*** (3.43)     | 0.703*** (3.34)   |                     | 0.660*** (3.42)     | 0.181 (0.58)   |                     | 0.124 (0.43)        |
| valuation of job security: I try to avoid mistakes                 | -0.042 (-0.33)  | -0.023 (-0.19)      |                     | -0.106 (-0.79)  | -0.093 (-0.73)      |                     | 0.107 (0.45)   | 0.204 (0.86)        |                     |
| Relatives working in civil service                                 |   | 0.352 (1.35)        |                     |   | 0.080 (0.29)        |                     |  | 1.013* (1.89)       |                     |
| Achievement motivation (6 items, alpha=.65)                        |   | 0.359 (1.44)        |                     |   | 0.423 (1.56)        |                     |  | -0.039 (-0.09)      |                     |
| valuation of stable income   |   | 0.168 (1.36)        |                     |   | 0.214 (1.60)        |                     |  | -0.045 (-0.21)      |                     |
| Constant   | -1.632 (-1.22)  | -1.277 (-0.99)      | 2.96872             | -2.093 (-1.42)  | -1.530 (-1.10)      | -2.326** (-2.11)    | -3.763 (-1.52)   | -3.394 (-1.44)      | -2.610 (-1.45)      |
| Number of observations   |   | 285                 | 285                 | 291   | 285                 | 285                 | 291  | 285                 | 285                 |
| AIC  |   | 355.277             | 371.355             | 362.626   | 322.143             | 337.563             | 328.073  | 154.629             | 156.377             |
| BIC  |   | 391.802             | 404.228             | 380.992   | 358.668             | 370.435             | 346.439  | 191.154             | 189.249             |
| BIC prime  |   | 21.966              | 34.392              | 6.269   | 22.464              | 34.231              | 6.538  | 40.669              | 38.764              |
| Likelihood ratio Chi2  |   | 28.907              | 10.828              | 16.424  | 28.408              | 10.989              | 16.156   | 10.204              | 6.456               |
| McFadden's R2  |   | 0.079               | 0.03                | 0.045   | 0.086               | 0.033               | 0.048  | 0.07                | 0.045               |
| McFadden's R2 adjusted   |   | 0.024               | -0.02               | 0.017   | 0.025               | -0.021              | 0.018  | -0.068              | -0.08               |
| ML (Cox-Snell) R2  |   |                     |                     |   |                     |                     |  |                     |                     |
| Cragg-Uhler's (Nagelkerke) R2                                      |   | 0.134               | 0.052               | 0.076   | 0.138               | 0.055               | 0.079  | 0.088               | 0.056               |
| Correctly classified (as a percentage)                             |   | 66.32%              | 68.07%              | 66.67   | 72.63               | 73.68               | 74.23  | 92.98               | 92.98               |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Notes: Own data and figure

## **6. Estimation results**

Estimation results for the response variable ‘first order job preference’ are reported in Figure 7. Model fit is rather low. Models for the dependent variable ‘regional civil service’ are especially low; there are only a small number of persons who intend to work in regional government. Estimation is difficult for such rare events. We continue with the model with the best fit and select only perceived attractiveness of federal government job.

Brant test of the parallel regression assumption indicate that none of the reported models violates the assumption. Ordered logistic regressions are thus the preferred estimation approach. OLS regression on a limited dependent variable would result in biased estimates and thus misleading results.

**Figure 8: Estimation results: Perceived attractiveness**

|  | ( 1 )   | ( 2 )  | ( 3 )  | ( 4 )  | ( 5 )  | ( 6 )  |
|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
|  | Perceived attractiveness of a job in FEDERAL civil service (five-choice outcome, from 1=very unattractive to 5=highly attractive) |  |  | Perceived attractiveness of a job in REGIONAL civil service (five-choice outcome, from 1=very unattractive to 5=highly attractive) |  |  |
|  | <i>b</i> , a coefficient ( <i>z</i> , a z-statistic)  | <i>b</i> , a coefficient ( <i>z</i> , a z-statistic) | <i>b</i> , a coefficient ( <i>z</i> , a z-statistic) | <i>b</i> , a coefficient ( <i>z</i> , a z-statistic)   | <i>b</i> , a coefficient ( <i>z</i> , a z-statistic) | <i>b</i> , a coefficient ( <i>z</i> , a z-statistic) |
| Sex (1=female, 0=male)   | 0.143 (0.59)  | 0.139 (0.57)   | 0.146 (0.62)   | -0.232 (-1.02)   | -0.103 (-0.45)                                       | -0.206 (-0.92)                                       |
| Parents working in civil service (1=yes)                           | 0.186 (0.14)  |  |  | 1.235 (0.94)   |  |  |
| Collectivism: allocentric towards relevant others (1 low - 5 high) | -0.451** (-2.11)  | -0.420** (-2.23)                                     | -0.332* (-1.83)                                      | -0.151 (-0.73)   | -0.129 (-0.72)                                       | -0.058 (-0.33)                                       |
| Interaction term: collectivism × parents in civil service          | 0.063 (0.14)  |  |  | -0.095 (-0.22)   |  |  |
| Aspiration level, <i>reverse</i> (1 high - 5 low)                  | -0.093 (-0.92)  | -0.151 (-1.55)                                       |  | -0.052 (-0.54)   | -0.111 (-1.20)                                       |  |
| University   | -0.560** (-2.06)  | -0.331 (-1.23)                                       | -0.495* (-1.94)                                      | -0.776*** (-2.98)  | -0.665** (-2.57)                                     | -0.789*** (-3.18)                                    |
| Power motivation (2 items, SBC=.67, alpha=.67)                     | 0.296** (2.38)  |  |  | 0.118 (0.99)   |  |  |
| Public service motivation (3 items, alpha=.64)                     | 0.753*** (5.12)   |  | 0.798*** (5.72)                                      | 0.567*** (4.13)  |  | 0.562*** (4.37)                                      |
| valuation of job security: 1 try to avoid mistakes                 | -0.201* (-1.84)   | -0.225** (-2.05)                                     |  | 0.005 (0.05)   | -0.013 (-0.13)                                       |  |
| Relatives working in civil service                                 |   | 0.251 (1.09)   |  |  | 0.555** (2.52)                                       |  |
| Achievement motivation (6 items, alpha=.65)                        |   | 0.890*** (3.89)                                      |  |  | 0.547** (2.49)                                       |  |
| valuation of stable income   |   | 0.212* (1.95)  |  |  | 0.160 (1.52)   |  |
| Cut1 Constant  | -2.211** (-2.06)  | -1.598 (-1.41)                                       | -1.749** (-2.11)                                     | -1.111 (-1.07)   | -0.752 (-0.68)                                       | -1.35* (-1.72)                                       |
| Cut2 Constant  | -1.376 (-1.31)  | -0.730 (-0.65)                                       | -0.879 (-1.09)                                       | -0.287 (-0.28)   | 0.066 (0.06)   | -0.525 (-0.68)                                       |
| Cut3 Constant  | -0.066 (-0.06)  | 0.530 (0.48)   | 0.385 (0.48)   | 1.184 (1.15)   | 1.499 (1.37)   | 0.928 (1.20)   |
| Cut4 Constant  | 1.233 (1.17)  | 1.708 (1.53)   | 1.631** (2.02)                                       | 3.030*** (2.91)  | 3.306*** (2.97)                                      | 2.714*** (3.44)                                      |
| Number of observations   |   | 285  | 285  | 291  | 283  | 283  |
| AIC  |   | 705.977  | 717.781  | 723.78   | 824.686  | 838.39   |
| BIC  |   | 753.459  | 761.611  | 753.166  | 872.077  | 882.136  |
| BIC prime  |   | 0.898  | 7.587  | -16.158  | 4.577  | 13.745   |
| Likelihood ratio Chi2  |   | 49.975   | 37.633   | 38.851   | 46.232   | 31.419   |
| McFadden's R2  |   | 0.068  | 0.051  | 0.052  | 0.055  | 0.037  |
| McFadden's R2 adjusted   |   | 0.033  | 0.019  | 0.031  | 0.024  | 0.009  |
| Cragg-Uhler's (Nagelkerke) R2                                      |   | 0.174  | 0.134  | 0.135  | 0.159  | 0.111  |

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Notes: Own data and figure

Results from ordered logistic regressions indicate that a high degree of collectivism, allocentrism towards relevant others, is associated with a low perceived attractiveness of a job in federal civil service. Being a student in university Two is associated with a lower probability to perceive federal civil service jobs highly attractive. One explanation is that university Two attracts a different type of students (attraction-selection already at student's level). Another possible explanation is that university Two teaches its students different values. Power motivation has a significant positive impact on how attractive students perceive a federal civil service job. The positive effect is not significant for regional civil service employment. Public service motivation has a highly significant positive impact on the perceived attractiveness of federal and regional civil service employment. Our results suggest that public service motivation draws PA undergraduates to work in public service. A high level of risk aversion makes a positive perception of federal civil service employment rather unlikely. People who report that they try to avoid mistakes are likely to perceive federal civil service employment as less attractive. Relatives working in public service increase the likelihood to perceive regional civil service employment as highly attractive. For parents in civil service we find no similar significant effect. One possible explanation is that the statement "I perceive regional employment as attractive" is just a way of saying 'I intend to return to my home town after graduation, where I have relatives working in civil service as well'. Even if this holds true this will not explain why we do not find any significant effect from parents in civil service on perceived attractiveness. Achievement motivation has a positive impact on perceived attractiveness of both federal and regional civil service employment. And undergraduates who value a stable income are likely to perceive federal civil service as an attractive job choice.

## **7. Discussion and conclusion**

In this paper we present detailed observations of the self-reported job preferences of 2nd public administration undergraduates in two prestigious universities in Moscow, Russian Federation. We report that federal civil service is the top destination for Russian PA undergraduates. We also report that working in federal civil service by far triumphs over regional public administration in terms of self-reported occupational intention. The surprising result from the survey data is that only one in four public administration graduates intend to work in civil service upon graduation. Given the fact that all respondents are enrolled in a public administration program we would expect a much higher level of civil service job

intention. To us this private – public sector gap is somewhat surprising. One potential explanation is that sector preferences and work values could be a dynamic state (Choi and Chung 2017). Moscow is the financial and commercial center of Russia; the city offers a wide range of job opportunities both in the non-profit and the private business sector while in other parts of Russia government is often a primary employer. Recognizing unrestricted work opportunities in the capital some students may have changed their occupational intentions after entering university.

We proposed a general model of job preference formation with respect to public sector employment. We drew a line between first order job preference for different types of civil service and perceived attractiveness of public sector employments. We find that the motivation to serve society drives the intention to work in civil service after graduation. And the motivation to do good for other people also fuels a positive perception of public sector employment. This result is line with theoretical arguments and a number of empirical studies. We are able to explain perceived attractiveness much better than first order civil service job intention.

The results do not confirm parts of our general model. There is very little, if any, evidence that supports our position that relevant others drive public sector job intention; and also that the motivation to comply with these expectation drives job intentions. What we find instead is that the degree of collectivism does play a role for civil service job intentions. We observe that collectivism, i.e. reflecting on relevant others in decision making, is associated with a low intention for and perceived attractiveness of public service employment.

Further steps may include structural equation modelling (SEM); SEM would allow reflecting the fact that students are nested in universities. SEM would also allow for testing for a moderating effect of collectivism and aspiration level. So far we modelled them as indicator variables. Future refinement of the model may reflect the idea that occupational intention might also result from two other major sources: public perceptions of public service, and peer effects within social groups of students. Finally our concept of public service motivation requires some further critical discussion in the future.



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